This is a personal view of applied mathematics in a truly nonacademic setting (an operational Navy Command), based on my experiences as a field representative of the Operations Evaluation Group. The principles that can make analysis effective in such a setting are described and explained. The intermeshing of people and personality is as important as the fields themselves. The traits that a mathematician needs to effect change by his analysis are discussed. A number of specific examples are provided to illustrate the kinds of problems that can be encountered.
Introduction
Although this purports to be a paper about nonacademic applied mathematics, it is really about the interaction of applied mathematicians and naval operators. By "operator," I mean an individual whose job involves some part of naval action, e.g. navigating a ship, flying an aircraft, running a radar, etc. The wording is important, because I believe that when applied mathematics is done in a nonacademic setting, the intermeshing of people is as important as the fields or techniques involved. The nonacademic setting for me was an operational naval command at Whidbey Island, Washington, where I worked as the Operations Evaluation Group field representative for a period of 18 months.
Hence, this is a personal view, but I think that much of what will be said here translates to other fields with little or no change.
Very often in research, the actual process of doing research is more satisfying than the particular problem being studied. It is for this reason that nonacademic applied mathematics can be so rewarding.
But there is a serious pitfall, one that should be acknowledged from the outset. It is difficult to describe this kind of work without its appearing to be trivial. And often the more applied a problem is, the more mathematically trivial it may be. This runs against the training we receive in mathematics that "harder is better."
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On the other hand, in many applied problems the real difficulty and the intellectual challenge are in finding and characterizing the problem in the first place, not in solving it. The harder-is-better syndrome is a pitfall that can be overcome, once one is aware of it. Of course, one will not become "famous" in the applied mathematics community by solving problems that appear to be easy. This is another trade-off that must be considered.
In the next section, I describe the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), one of the oldest organizations in the United States doing operations research and one of the few that is still problem, rather than technique, oriented. I discuss the principles that make OEG effective. In section 3, I discuss the problems that naval operators face. They are generally operational, not technical ones, and require useful, immediate solutions. In section 4, I describe what I believe an applied mathematician can offer to the operators in terms of approach and outlook. In section 5, three examples of problems that I wrked on are given. There are many other examples alluded to, but these three capture the essence of the work.
At the outset, I wish to thank many officers and enlisted men and women who helped me, especially LCdr. Bill Headridge and Capt. Paul
Hollandsworth, whose efforts made my tour a success, and who are now my good friends. I also thank RAdm. Henry Arnold, who as the commander at Whidbey created such a good working environment. understanding, prediction, and improvement in system performance.
The Operations Evaluation Group

Problems of Naval Operators
The problems faced by the operators can be characterized as follows. First, the problems are operational, not technical or design. The operator has a piece of equipment that undoubtedly could be improved, but he needs to figure out how to use it today. An analyst who tells him how to improve the equipment without telling him how to use today's equipment only angers and alienates the operator. For example, the EA-6B is a sophisticated electronic warfare aircraft first built for use in Viet Nam. There are presently two versions of the aircraft used in the fleet; they differ mainly in the automated nature of the detection and identification process. Two other versions that will be even more automated are being designed. These new aircaft will reduce the operators' workload considerably. The operators, however, need tactics for the present-day aircraft, not for the superior ones down the line.
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The second characteristic of the problems is that although operators are looking for good ways of doing their jobs, optimizing some mathematical criterion is not their goal. This is especially important because most soluble mathematical optimization problems have little to do with the real operation. In H. Simon's language [7 and 8] , they are seeking to satisfy rather than optimize. An example of this phenomenon arises in search theory. Searches are conducted almost every day by Naval operators, and starting in World War II, the theory of search developed into a mathematical subject of complexity and sophistication [4 and 91.
In the development of search theory, the idea of optimal search has played a central role. Yet, the operators often do not care if they have an optimal search plan--they just want one that is "not too bad." They need a figure like figure I and want to know if life follows curve A or curve B. This will determine how close to the optimum their plan needs to be for it to be adequate.
The third characteristic of the problems is that there are always stochastic factors present in the world and often deterministic biases that may be larger, generally unknown, and very hard to deal with. The presence of stochastic fluctuations and unknown deterministic biases makes it impossible to approach problems as if life were predictable and controllable from the outset. I shall provide two examples of this phenomenon in section 5.
Two characteristics concern the operators themselves. They are not mathematicians, but after they are convinced that the analyst cares, often they can see the value of a well-presented analysis. Often the problems tackled by the analyst require only algebra, elementary statistics, and calculus. There are many officers who have these tools and lack the confidence to use them, but they can appreciate the analysis. The final, and perhaps most important, characteristic that the mathematician needs is the desire to solve problems. One cannot be successful in this kind of work if he brings techniques and looks for problems that can be solved by his techniques. The problems are paramount, and one needs the versatility to bring in any techniques that can be used to solve the problems.
The particular academic training in courses and in research is not as important as the characteristics described above. One has to be willing to learn more and to learn whatever is needed for the job.
Some Examples of Problems
In this section, I discuss three problems, initiated by operators, that I worked on while I was the OEG Field Representative at the Whidbey Island (Washington) Naval Air Station. The aircraft operating out of Whidbey are the medium attack A-6 bomber and the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft.
EA-6B Pod Availability
The EA-6B carries its jamming equipment in poK, that are mounted on the wing stations. There are two transmitters per pod and each aircraft can carry up to five pods. Ideally, one would like all pods to work all the time. I shall refer to the overall fraction of the time that a pod worked as the availability of the pod.
If the availability is low, then it is important to understand the causes of poor availability and ways to improve it.
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Within a few weeks of my arrival in February, 1979 at Whidbey, a squadron returned home from a cruise with data on pod availability.
They had set some simple criteria for a pod's being classified as working and had counted the fraction of pods that worked. They found low availability. These numbers were reported to the Admiral, who wanted further investigation. He tasked an officer, who came to me with the log book that the squadron had used and asked me to sift through the data and analyze it.
When the data were first reported as "a certain type of pod worked 70 percent of the time," one infers a picture of pod availability. The picture in this case is flipping a coin, a simple Bernoulli trial. As I analyzed that data, it became clear that a more complex picture was needed. I developed a series of Markov models for pod availability, the simplest of which is the following.
Assume that there are only two states for a pod, mission capable (MC) or not mission capable (NMC) and let Pl(n), Po(n) be the probabilities that a pod is MC or 1*(C on the nth flight. Let pll, Plot Poo, Po1 be the probability of transition MC -MC, MC -NMC, NMC -NKC, NMC -* MC, respectively. Then
The stationary solution of equation 2 is
PI is
The PlI, which can be estimated from the data, have the following interpretations: pO 1 is a measure of the effectiveness of maintenance, because it characterizes the rate at which pods that are NMC return to the MC state; pll is a measure of reliability, because it characterizes the probability that a pod which is MC remains MC. The long-term availability can be low if either p 0 1 or pl 1 is low; however, ways to increase availability differ very much if the problem is in maintenance or reliability. If p0 1 is small, so that maintenance is the cause of poor availability, it may be possible to improve availability through increased attention to the problems of maintenance. Thus, one is faced with a command problem. If p 1 1 is small, however, the problem of poor availability is related to the design of the equipment and improving availability may no longer be connected with operational aspects. I found that p 0 1 was about .2 or less, whereas pl 1 was about .8 or more, and concluded that availability could probably be improved by command attention to maintenance.
I checked other predictions of the simple two-state Markov model against the data and found that this simple model stood up well to scrutiny; so I presented my results to the command. I argued and convinced officers that the picture of the operations must be changed.
Pod status is no longer analogous to flipping a coin, but more complicated verbal models are needed.
After the completion of this initial work, we began an in-depth study of the causes of low pod availability. We started using a fourstate Markov chain model and collected data from seven of the ten EA-6B
squadrons that go to the fleet. Along with operational data collected on aircrew debrief sheets, we had maintenance data sent back to Whidbey. I continued my analysis of these data, using any mathematical or statistical technique that I thought helpful. Warfare. This work certainly led to a change in the way that the problem was viewed; whether the overall availability will increase due to recommendations being followed remains to be seen.
Wings-Level Landings on Angle Decks
I became involved in this problem because I shared an office with an experienced A-6 pilot and overheard a conversation. My office mate was arguing with two new pilots about the possibility of a "wings-level" landing on a carrier deck. The young pilots asserted that in flight training they were given proof that it was possible to line up the aircraft with the landing deck of the carrier and then drive the ship with the proper velocity so that a pilot can land without making another correction. Because the older pilot did not believe these claims, even when he saw the proof, he asked me to take a look at the problem.
The relevant geometry is sketched in figure 2 . A vector parallel to the angle deck is I = (1,-I/tan a ); a characteristic value is a= 10 degrees. In typical operations, the ship is driven so that the resultant of ship and natural wind is "straight down the angle," i.e.
parallel to I, with a magnitude of about 30 knots. Suppose that ship's velocity vector is b (bxtby) and the wind is w -(wx,-wy) so that the resultant wind is r -(wx-bx,-wy-by). We now want to drive the ship so Thus, it appears that wing-level landings are at least theoretically possible in a nonfluctuating world. Let us consider now the effects of fluctuations in the velocity of the ship and aircraft.
In such a case, we can only ask for the probability of a wings-level landing. To do this, let (Sx(t), Sy(t)) and (A 1 (t), A.(t)) denote the positions of the ship and aircraft, respectively (assuming that they 
Sx ( 
2 2 y (t) In this example, the ship stays at the origin. Thus, the probability of a wings-level landing is the joint probability that Ax(t) and AY(t) are simultaneously approximately 0. By approximately, let us understand that they are within 2. of 0. The probability of a wingslevel landing PL can then be defined by
-(y-Py(t)) 2/2a 2(t) dy
In table 2, values of P are given for these parameters: ay -1 n.mi., v 120 knots, a = 10 degrees and various values of a, and 02. We assume that they are equal, so that 01 0 02 -o and define the intensity of fluctuations by (a2 + a2 + 2 1/2 where td is the deterministic time to land the aircraft. When considering the results shown in table 2, one should also know that aviators are given badges for 100 landings on a carrier. Thus, an event that has a probability of occurrence of 1O -4 each landing is rarely going to be observed in any aviator's career. The conclusion is that wings-level landings are possible, but highly improbable in the world modelled by equation 5.
Three-Bearing Method for Passive Localization
One of the missions of the EA-6B is that of passive localization of surface radar emitters. This localization is done by some sort of triangulation. The observing bearing between aircraft and emitter, 0 0,
where Or is the real bearing between the aircraft and emitter, b(Or) is a deterministic, but unknown bias function, and e is a random noise term. For the EA-6B, Ib(er)I may be as large as 30 degrees, whereas the rms deviation of e is about I to 3 degrees.
Since about 1945, triangulation problems with random noise received much attention (e.g. [12 and 13] ), but the questions of the unknown deterministic bias were ignored. In the EA-6B, at least, the deterministic bias overrides the random noise in almost all cases, and yet until recently there was no way to treat it. Together with two officers, an EA-6B operator and an A-6 pilot, I developed the following method for localization in systems with an unknown deterministic bias [14] . Its operational description is the following:
1. An initial value of the observed bearing, 801 -a, is recorded. The geometry associated with this operation is shown in figure 3 .
The aircraft turns through an angle
Referring to figure 3 and using the law of sines twice shows that I snr2 . (20) 2 sinOr
This method was flight tested in the summer of 1980 and was found to be operationally feasible and accurate to within 10 percent or less in range error. Thus, this method allows triangulation in systems with an unknown bias. In [14] , it is shown how random errors can be incorporated into the method. believe that it is important to recognize the prevalence of stochastic effects and of unknown deterministic biases in the natural world. Too much analysis is done based on assumptions of a perfectly predictable world in which plans can be made at the outset and need not be changed.
Honesty requires that I point out some of the frustrations of this kind of work. The first is a lack of continuity. With good reason, an analyst should be at a field assignment no longer than about 2 or 3 years. Otherwise he becomes stale and too emotionally involved with his job to retain a high level of objectivity. But there is no reason to expect that your replacement will follow up on projects that you have started. In general, that will not happen and it can be disappointing. The second frustration is that, as with all other jobs, there is drudgery in this job also. Not every day contains excitement. A third type of frustration is that often there is little feedback about the analysis one has done. The analyst finds himself forcing people to read his work and respond to it. Sometimes this is an unpleasant task. These frustrations appear in almost any job, and surely some would appear in any academic job.
The principles that make OEG effective undoubtedly will work in any type of nonacademic setting and point the way for mathematicians to be effective in the use of their tools. 
